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DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES: REMEDIES
FOR ABUSE
Collection agencies perform a necessary and unpleasant function: the
collection of delinquent debts. If this chore were easily accomplished, the
need for the agencies' services presumably would be far less acute. However,
in their work the agencies face the problem of forcing a debtor to repay
money when he cannot or will not do so. Debtors often do not respond to a
polite request for payment. Consequently, the agencies seek other means to
recover the money, including the threat of a lawsuit or the request of a
debtor's employer to withhold his wages. Such methods have at times been
deemed legitimate by courts.'
Even if conduct of this nature is permissible, agencies, after several
futile requests for payment, engage in more extreme conduct not easily
justified. This activity may include the threat of loss of employment and
the continual harassment of strategically timed telegrams and special de-
livery letters.2 Courts and legislatures have been confronted by the problem
of defining the point at which the interest of a collection agency in debt
recovery must yield to a debtor's right to be free from harassment. This
comment will examine judicial attempts to provide debtors with protection
from overly zealous collection agencies. It will then turn to the legislative
effort to strengthen the protection afforded by the courts. The statutes of
several states in particular and the provisions of a proposed Model Act will
receive analysis in terms of their protective purposes and capacity.'
I. COMMON LAW
Courts have sought to moderate the conduct of creditors by allowing
debtors to recover for defamation, 4 invasion of the right of privacy, 5 and
intentional infliction of mental anguish. 6 The problems encountered and re-
sults achieved by attempts to curtail the activities of collection agencies
through judicial action become apparent in an examination of representative
cases.
A. Intentional Infliction of Mental Anguish
Duty v. General Fin. Co. 7 was a major case involving an action for
damages for mental anguish and physical injuries received as a result of
1 E.g., Davis v. General Fin. & Thrift Co., 80 Ga. App. 708, 57 S.E.2d 225 (1950) ;
Yoder v. Smith, 253 Iowa 505, 112 N.W.2d 862 (1962).
2 See Duty v. General Fin. Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954).
3 The statutes to be examined are: Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 71-2001-10 (Supp. 1967) ;
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 6850-6956.2 (West 1964), as amended, §§ 6867-6956 (West
Supp. 1968) ; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 27-1-1-26 (1964), as amended, §§ 27-1-3-27 (Supp.
1967; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 42-127-133 (1960); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 32,
§§ 571-83 (Supp. 1968) ; N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 67-15-22-89 ('1961); N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 66-
41-49 (1965) ; Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 697.010-.470 (Supp. 1967) ; National Conference of
Lawyers and Collection Agencies, A Model Act to License and Regulate Collection
Agencies, 70 Corn. L.J. 38 (1965) [hereinafter cited as The Model Act].
4 Turner v. Brien, 184 Iowa 320, 167 N.W. 584 (1918).
5 Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956).
6 La Salle Extension Univ. v. Fogarty, 126 Neb. 457, 253 N.W. 424 (1934).
7 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64 (1954).
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defendants' efforts to recover money lent to plaintiffs. In their complaint plain-
tiffs alleged an exhaustive catalogue of harassment. They asserted that de-
fendants had made daily telephone calls to both Mr. and Mrs. Duty;
accused them of being "deadbeats"; stated to their neighbors that they were
"deadbeats"; threatened to cause both plaintiffs loss of their jobs unless they
made the payments demanded; telephoned each of the plaintiffs at work
several times daily; personally called on them at work; sent telegrams and
special delivery letters during the night; and left red cards in their door,
inscribed with insults and thinly veiled threats. 8 The plaintiffs claimed that
all the actions were willful and committed with the knowledge that they
would cause plaintiffs mental and physical illness. The court reversed the
ruling of the trial court, which had dismissed the petition for failure to state a
cause of action, and remanded for disposition.°
Several difficulties inhere in actions brought for mental anguish. Some
courts, fearing feigned complaints, have refused to award damages for
mental injury without the presence of physical harm. 1 ° The desire to prevent
fraudulent claims may also make it more difficult for a plaintiff to recover in
those jurisdictions which do allow recovery on the basis of an intentional in-
fliction of mental anguish. This reluctance to award damages, while justified
in terms of its intended policy, has limited the effectiveness of court action as
a means of restraining the activity of collection agencies. Another difficulty
attending this cause of action is the requirement that the emotional stress
must be the result of "extreme and outrageous conduct." 11 It may be difficult
for a plaintiff to establish that the conduct of a collection agency meets this
standard. A further obstacle arises from the requirement that the emotional
stress be severe.12 A collection agency's job normally involves causing a
debtor some mental unrest. The normal strain caused a debtor by contact
with an agency is not enough to entitle him to recover. The debtor has to
establish serious mental stress. The debtor often may have difficulty in show-
ing an emotional reaction sufficient as a basis for a damage award. Conse-
quently, collection agencies may be able to conduct their business in an
offensive manner short of the degree of severity required for tort liability.
B. Invasion of Privacy
Some courts have allowed recovery on a theory of an invasion of the
right to privacy. Housh v. Peth 13 involved a plaintiff's contention that the
defendant collection agency had harassed her by continually calling her at late
hours, by causing her employer to threaten to discharge her, by telling her
landlord that plaintiff did not pay her bills, and asking the landlord about her
earnings. Plaintiff asserted that these actions constituted an invasion of her
8 Id. at 18-19, 273 S.W.2d at 65.
2 The lower court had based its ruling on an earlier decision, Harned v. E-Z Fin.
Co., 151 Tea. 641, 254 S.W.2d 81 (1953), in which recovery for mental suffering was
denied plaintiff. The court in Duty distinguished the prior case on the ground that it
contained no allegation of physical injury.
10 E.g., Harned v. E-Z Fin. Co., 151 Tea. 641, 254 S.W.2d 81 (1953).
11 See Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961).
12 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965).
13 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956).
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right of privacy and caused her nervousness, mental anguish and similar dis-
tress. Plaintiff asked for a temporary restraining order and a permanent in-
junction against these tactics, and for damages. A temporary restraining order
was issued and damages awarded. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the
decision, and recognized that a systematic campaign to harass the plaintiff
made defendant's conduct an unreasonable effort to collect the money."
In Housh, the court approved a charge stating that "the invasion of the
right of privacy may be defined . . . as the wrongful intrusion into one's
private activities in such manner as to outrage or to cause mental suffering,
shame or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities."" The test adopted
by Housh for a violation of the right of privacy may not give a debtor sufficient
protection, since recovery requires the intrusion to outrage or cause shame or
mental suffering to a person of ordinary sensibilities. This standard still permits
a collection agency to engage in practices which may be characterized as
abusive. For example, the court in Housh stated that an agency could inform
an employer of his employee's debts without invading the debtor's right of
privacy."
C. Defamation
A third means of recovery in aid of a debtor against a collection agency
is an action for defamation. In Turner v. Brien, 17
 the plaintiff became em-
broiled with defendant as to the amount of money owed by the plaintiff.
Plaintiff claimed that he owed 16 dollars and offered to pay it. Defendant
contended that the amount involved was 20 dollars and refused anything less.
During the course of this dispute, defendant arranged to have plaintiff's
name listed in a pamphlet as a poor credit risk. Plaintiff alleged that after the
appearance of this publication he was refused credit by various merchants and
was deprived of the benefit of public confidence and goodwill. Plaintiff further
alleged that the publication was false, was known to be so by defendant, and
was published with the intent to deprive him of the benefit of public confi-
dence. A verdict for plaintiff was upheld on appeal. The court stated that
the jury could well find that the thought conveyed and intended to
be conveyed was that the plaintiff was not worthy of credit. ..
Such publications usually and ordinarily have the effect of de-
priving one of public confidence and esteem. The general rule is
that any publication concerning a person or his affairs, which from
its nature, necessarily must, or presumably will, as its natural and
proximate consequence, occasion him pecuniary loss, is libelous
per se."
Actions for defamation as a means of restraining collection agencies from
harassing a debtor are not very effective. An agency may escape penalty if it
can establish the truth of any allegations which it makes.' 9
 Even more im-
14 Id. at 41, 133 N.E.2d at 344.
15 Id. at 39, 133 N.E.2d at 343.
76 Id. at 40-41, 133 N.E.2d at 344.
17 184 Iowa 320, 167 N.W. 584 (1918).
18
 Id. at 325, 167 N.W. at 586.
19 Crain v. Thomas, 122 Utah 122, 247 13.2d 264 (1952).
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portant is the limited scope of such a remedy. By its very nature, a suit for
defamation is concerned primarily with the truth of certain statements or
publications, not with the quality or effect of certain associated conduct.
Activities such as constant phoning of a debtor are not remedied by a right of
action for defamation.
D. Weaknesses of Common Law Remedies
Several broad problems accompany judicial remedies. One general difr
ficulty is that a collection agency may act in a manner reprehensible but
nevertheless insufficient to entitle a plaintiff to recover in a law suit. For
example, a few "obscene" letters to a person, admittedly in debt, may not
cause him sufficient mental distress to enable him to recover damages for
mental anguish from the agency responsible for the letters. The letters prob-
ably do not constitute an invasion of the debtor's right to privacy and, even
if they do, damages would be difficult to measure. Finally, "obscenity" is
not necessarily defamation. The common law, in such a case, does not provide
a debtor with any protection.
Another problem with litigation as a means of curbing abusive agency
practices is that a person may not desire the publicity attending a law suit
arising out of the collection process. His reluctance to institute an action
against an agency does not make agency practices any less objectionable
but, unfortunately, protects their continuance.
The fact that debtors most often subjected to abusive practices are also
most hesitant to invoke legal protection in the courts serves to render the
judicial remedy even less effective. Debtors of lower economic and educational
levels are perhaps most susceptible to abuse from agencies. Those at higher
levels either are more likely to be able to pay their debts or, if their debts are
referred to an agency, are more likely to pay with much less prompting.
Agency practices generally do not become blameworthy until initial attempts
to obtain payment prove futile. It is among the poor that the need for protec-
tion is the greatest, and it is among the same people that alienation from the
legal system is the greatest. Protection available only through the courts is of
little practical value to this group.
Probably the major inadequacies of common law remedies inhere in the
very nature of the adjudicative process. Recovery by one plaintiff does not
necessarily mean that an agency will cease its offensive conduct toward other
people. The loss of a few law suits may be a minor consideration if the tactics
involved succeed in other collection efforts. Another defect of case-byrcase
treatment lies in the length of time needed for a judicial standard to become
discernible. A judicially defined standard of prohibited conduct often reduces
to individual determinations of reasonableness. It is not the function of a
court to promulgate a list of prohibited acts.
In short, relief available through present common law remedies is not
sufficient for several reasons. Not all conduct that one might wish forbidden
affords a basis for relief in court. The economic and social class most in need
of protection is precisely the class most alienated from the legal system and
therefore least likely to attempt to vindicate its rights through litigation.
Relief to one debtor does not necessarily provide any protection to other
701
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
members of that class. Finally, a judicial sanction can be somewhat indefinite
because of difficulties inherent in the translation of adjudicated results into
generalized rules. These shortcomings contrast sharply with the capacity of
legislative prohibition and regulation.
II. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
The obvious legislative solution is the enactment of an enforceable code
of conduct for the collection industry. These standards would serve to place
certain forms of conduct definitely beyond the limits of permissible behavior.
Regulatory action does not necessarily involve the awarding of damages to a
plaintiff-debtor. Once the possibility of recovery for fraudulent claims is re-
moved, there is no need to establish prerequisites for recovery such as
"excessive and outrageous behavior" or "extreme emotional stress." In other
words, certain conduct can be barred whether or not it actually injures a
debtor.
Much of the effort to regulate the conduct of agencies has been insti-
gated by the collection industry itself. Proposals have included a Model Act
containing a section proscribing certain collection practices by agencies?')
Not all state acts seek to protect the debtor. Some statutes, for example,
attempt to regulate only the relationship between the creditor and the collec-
tion agency. 21 Attention will be focused on efforts to protect the debtor, and
examination of state legislation will be confined to several statutes 22 repre-
sentative of legislative attempts to control the agencies' treatment of debtors.
The state statutes, along with the Model Act, will be evaluated in terms of
the protection afforded a debtor. The statutes and the Act reduce to several
analytical categories: prohibited conduct; methods of administration; and
sanctions.
A. Licensing Requirements
All the statutes under consideration, with the exception of Connecticut's,
require that collection agencies be licensed?- 3 Collecting debts without a
license is a misdemeanor and, in most of the states, is punishable by a fine
and/or imprisonment.24 Connecticut's failure to require agencies to obtain
a license lessens the effectiveness of its statute. The presence of a licensing
provision enables a state to scrutinize more carefully entrants into the
20 The Model Act § 6.
21 E.g., Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 649.010-,210 (1967).
22 See note 3 supra.
23 Ark. Stat. Ann. § 71-2001 (Supp. 1967) ; CaI. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6870 (West
1964); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 27-1-1 (1964) ; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § 573(1)
(Supp. 1968) ; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 67-15-31 (1961) ; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-41 (1965);
Ore. Rev. Stat. § 697.030 (Supp. 1967) ; The Model Act § 3(a).
24 Ark. Stat. Ann. § 71-2010 (Supp. 1967) (fine) ; Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6871
(West 1964) (fine and/or imprisonment); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 27-1-21 (1963) (fine
and/or imprisonment) ; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § 573(2) (Supp. 1968) (fine
and/or imprisonment) ; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-47 (1965) (punishment is in the discretion
of the court) ; Ore. Rev. Stat. § 697.990 (Supp. 1967) (fine and/or imprisonment) ; The
Model Act § 3(b) (fine and/or imprisonment).
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business by imposition of entrance requirements. Without such supervision
almost anyone, without regard to qualification, is able to begin collecting
debts.
Under these licensing provisions, either an applicant is required to
produce evidence of his integrity, reputation and other personal character-
istics supposedly relevant to the ability to conduct the agency business
properly, or the appropriate state administrative body is given authority to
conduct an investigation of the applicant. 25 Although such standards of per-
sonal worth are often nebulous, they do represent an attempt by the state to
place some limitations on the type of entrepreneur who may enter upon a
career of debt collecting. The protection afforded a debtor by such a provision
is actually very slight. The very uncertainty of the provisions regarding
qualifications probably allows many to enter the business who feel that a
broad range of questionable conduct toward a debtor is reasonable. Some of
the statutes, which grant authority to investigate, do not provide any assur-
ance that this power will be invoked, nor do they give any indication of the
extent to which an investigation, once undertaken, must proceed. 26
B. Written Examinations
In addition to satisfying requirements dealing with his character, an
applicant, under several of the statutes, must pass an examination designed
to determine his ability to engage in the collection business. 27 A test of this
nature adds little to the protection received by a debtor. It does, however,
serve an incidental function insofar as it heightens an applicant's awareness
of the applicable rules and regulations and the corresponding penalties for
violation. This knowledge may serve to restrain a licensee from engaging in
some of the more outrageous harassing tactics.
25 Ark. Stat. Ann. § 71-2005 (Supp. 1967) ; Cal. Bus. 8 Prof. Code § 6875 (West
1964) ; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 27-1-5(7) (1964) ; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § 573(4)
(Supp. 1968) ; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 67-15-37 (1961) ; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-42 (1965) ; Ore.
Rev. Stat. § 697.041 (Supp. 1967) ; The Model Act § 3(d).
26 For example, "The Board shall have the authority to require an applicant for
a license to submit an application in writing containing such information . and may
require such character and business references which it deems appropriate." Ark. Stat.
Ann. § 71-2005 (Supp. 1967).
The Board is given the authority to require a written application. However, it does
not have to exercise the authority. Likewise, the remainder of the provision gives no
indication of the extent to which an applicant's history is to be subject to scrutiny.
Similarly, North Carolina's provisions on persons entitled to a permit are unclear.
Its provisions require that certain information be furnished the Commissioner to aid
him in the determination whether a permit should be issued. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-42
(1963). Anothei provision states, however, that the Commissioner may issue a license to
whomever he thinks proper, without stating what makes an applicant improper. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 66-44 (1963). The statute requires merely that "evidence of good moral character"
be given to the Commissioner. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-42 (1963). There is no requirement re-
garding the weight of evidence. The , Commissioner, upon its introduction, may then issue
a license, if he thinks it is proper.
27 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 6885, 6889 (West 1964) ; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 67-15-37
(1961) ; Ore. Rev. Stat. § 697.111 (Supp. 1967).
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C. Reports and Additional Information
Some states require licensees to file other matter besides their name and
business address. This information may include any change in name of the
business or the address of a new office. 28
 Such data can be useful for regula-
tory purposes. For example, if an agency is allowed to open a branch office
without an additional license for it, it will be difficult to impose sanctions on
the principal office (the licensee) in the absence of any knowledge of the
relationship between the two agencies. Of course, the more obvious difficulty
is simply the impossibility of supervising an office of unknown existence. 2 °
D. Prohibited Practices
Proscription of specific practices constitutes the most direct form of
regulation. 30
 Specificity is characteristic of such provisions." For example,
28
 For example, Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 27-1-9, -11 (1964) ; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 67-
15-62, -68, -70 (1961).
29
 California has perhaps gone farthest in requirement of material from applicants
and licensees. Each applicant must supply a photograph taken within a year of the date
of the application and two legible sets of fingerprints, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6876
(West 1964). Other provisions require that every employee be registered, Cal. Bus, &
Prof. Code § 6894 (West 1964) ; that notification be given of a change in residence, Cal.
Bus. & Prof. Code § 6994.8 (West 1964); and that any change in officers be reported,
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6913.1 (West 1964).
39
 Ark. Stat. Ann. § 71-2008 (Supp. 1967) ; Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6947 (West
1964) ; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 27-1-25 (Supp. 1967) ; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 42-131
(1960) ; Me, Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § 576 (Supp. 1968) ; N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 67-15-76, -78
(1961) ; N.C. Dep't of Ins., Reg. 7, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-46 (1965) ; Ore. Rule 20-270,
Ore. Dep't of Commerce, Directory of Licensed Collection Agencies and Debt Consolidat-
ing Agencies, Sept. 1, 1968 [hereinafter cited as Ore. Rule] ; The Model Act § 6.
31
 Arkansas and Maine have representative statutes. Arkansas prohibits:
5. Publishing or posting or causing to be published or posted, any list of debtors,
commonly known as "deadbeat" lists.
6. Collecting or attempting to collect by the use of any methods contrary to
the postal laws and regulations of the United States.
7. Having in his possession or making use of any badge, using a uniform
of any law enforcement agency or any simulation thereof, or making any state-
ments which might be construed as indicating an official connection with any
federal, state, county, or city law enforcement agency, or any other govern-
mental agency, while engaged in collection agency business.
8. Distributing any printed matter which is made to be similar or to resemble
government forms or documents, or legal forms used in civil or criminal
proceedings.
9. Advertising for sale or threatening to advertise for sale any claim as a means
of endeavoring to enforce payment thereof, or agreeing to do so for the purpose
of soliciting claims, except where the licensee has acquired claims as an assignee
for the benefit of creditors or where the licensee is acting under the order of a
court of competent jurisdiction.
10. Engaging in any unethical practices or resorting to any illegal means or
methods of collection.
11. Using profanity, obscenity, or vulgarity, while engaged in the collection
of claims.
12. No licensee shall address a letter to or telephone any debtor at his place
of employment unless a good-faith attempt has been made to contact such
debtor at his usual place of abode by letter, and that the mail has not been
returned and for which no answer has been received.
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the use of "deadbeat lists" is prohibited in most states. 32 Collecting or at-
tempting to collect by means contrary to the postal laws and regulations is
commonly forbidden." Some states have attempted to control obscenity and
profanity.34 Other provisions regulate the use of the telephone for purposes
of harassment. 35 Of course, it is always possible to imagine some form of
agency conduct not enumerated by statute. Many states include a broadly
termed residual provision in anticipation of unforeseeable forms of improper
conduct." The effectiveness of such provisions will depend on the enforce-
13. Using violence or threats of physical violence while engaged in the collection
of claims.
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 71-2008 (Supp. 1967).
Maine provides:
No collection agency shall: Threaten to bring legal action in its own name or
list the name of a lawyer; use or employ justices of the peace, constables,
sheriffs or any other officer authorized to serve legal papers in connection with
the collection of a claim; use or threaten to use physical violence in connection
with the collection of claims; . . . use instruments which simulate the form and
appearance of judicial process; . . . publish or cause to be published any list
of debtors except for credit reporting purposes or threaten to do so; use "shame
cards," "shame automobiles," or similar devices, methods of intimidation or
methods contrary to postal regulations to collect accounts; . . . advertise or
threaten to advertise for sale any claim as a means of forcing payment thereof,
unless such agency is acting as the assignee for the benefit of creditors or acting
under an order of court; . . operate under a name or in a manner which
implies that such agency is a branch of or associated with any department of
the Federal Government or of any state or municipal government, or use of
any seal, insignia, envelope or other format which simulates that of any gov-
ernment department or agency; . . . make repeated or harassing communications
to employers, or make collect telephone calls by subterfuge; • . collect or
attempt to collect from any person an amount in excess of the amount submitted
by the creditor for collection.
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § 576 (Supp. 1968).
32 A "deadbeat list" contains the names of debtors and is given to various people
and organizations for the purpose of harassing and embarrassing debtors.
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 71-2008(5) (Supp. 1967); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6947(b)
(West 1964); Colo. Rev, Stat. Ann. § 27-1-25(3) (1964); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§ 42-131(j) (1960); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § 576 (Supp. 1968); N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 67-15-78(B) (1961); Ore. Rule 20-270 [incorporating the Code of Ethics and Rules
of Conduct of the Oregon Collectors Association] ; The Model Act § 6(j).
33 Ark. Stat. Ann. § 71-2008(6) (Supp. 1967); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6947(c)
(West 1964); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 41-131(1) (1960); Mc. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § 576
(Supp. 1968) ; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 67-15-78(C) (1961) ; Ore. Rule 20-270 [incorporating
the Code of Ethics and Rules of Conduct of the Oregon Collectors Association]; The
Model Act § 6(k).
34 Ark. Stat. Ann. § 71-2008(11) (Supp. 1967); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6947(1)
(West 1964).
35 Ark. Stat. Ann. § 71-2008(12) (Supp. 1967) ; Mc, Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § 576
(Supp. 1968); N.C. Dept of Ins., Reg. 7(1), N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-46 (1965).
as Thus, Arkansas prohibits "[e]ngaging in any unethical practices or resorting to
any illegal means or methods of collection." Ark. Stat. Ann. § 71-2003(10) (Supp. 1967.).
Similarly, Oregon requires that
ielach member will show due consideration for the misfortunes of a debtor and
deal with him on the merits of his individual case. Each member will be fair
and reasonable with the debtor according to his financial and economic condition
and will permit him to pay the debt or obligation in installments of reasonable
size and frequency, measured by his earnings and other pressing indebtedness,
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ment policies of the agencies entrusted to administer them. Finally, it should
be noted that the catalogue of proscribed practices varies from statute to
statute,37
 and that usually omissions occur in each one. The New Mexico
statute, for instance, says nothing of the use of phone calls to a debtor's
employer or neighbors or of the employment of physical force or the threat
of it.38
 By contrast, Arkansas provisions do limit phone calls to employers
but not to neighbors. 38
E. Administration
Once these provisions are established the regulatory task becomes one of
administration. Under most statutes the task of supervising the activities
of the collection agencies is given to a state official and/or a state board."
The typical board established by the statutes has as a majority of its members
individuals in the collection agency business. 4 ' Its powers may include the
upon request, unless the debtor has previously broken a pledge regarding the
debt or unless there is a bona fide reason to believe that the debtor will not
keep his pledge.
Ore. Rule 20-270 [incorporating the Code of Ethics and Rules of Conduct of the Oregon
Collectors Association].
:37
 For example, compare the statutes in note 31 supra.
38
 N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 67-15-76, -78 (1961).
39
 Ark. Stat. Ann. § 71-2008 (Supp. 1967).
49 Arkansas has a state board, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 71-2003 (Supp. 1967) ; California
has a state board advising the chief of a Collection Agency Licensing Bureau, Cal. Bus.
& Prof. Code §§ 6860, 6865, 6868.5 (West 1964) ; Colorado's statute is administered by
a state board and the secretary of state, Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 27-1-3 (1964) ; Maine's
statute is administered by the Bank Commissioner and a Credit and Collection Board,
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § 583 (Supp. 1968) ; New Mexico's statute is administered
by the state bank examiner and a collection agency board, N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 67-15-24,
-27 (1961) ; North Carolina's statute is administered by the Commissioner of Insurance,
N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 66-41, -42, -45, -46 (1965) ; Oregon's statute is administered by a
Collection Agencies Board, Ore. Rev. Stat. § 697.402 (Supp. 1967) ; The Model Act
establishes a commissioner, The Model Act §§ 1, 3, 8-12.
Connecticut is an exception to the pattern. Under the Connecticut statute, the
prosecution of one who commits a violation is given to "Etlhe prosecuting attorney or
prosecuting grand juror of each town" who shall "diligently inquire and make due
complaint to the court having jurisdiction of all violations that come to their knowl-
edge...." Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 42-133 (1960).
A better solution to the problem of enforcement is a separate state administrative
body or official concerned with the problems caused by collection agency practices. Town
prosecutors and prosecuting grand jurors may be extremely busy. It is inadvisable to
increase their burden when there is a feasible alternative.
Furthermore, the presence of a state agency makes enforcement easier. It may be
difficult for a local prosecutor to investigate an agency not located in his area. And
if the debtor involved is without influence in the town, the prosecutor may be inclined
to use his resources on matters where there is greater public pressure for action.
A state organization is also better situated than local officials to coordinate all of the
information required of licensees, as presumably it would have greater resources and
time to devote to the task.
Finally, the presence of a state office makes it easier to produce uniformity with
regard to requirements and to their enforcement. Lack of statewide regulation effort is
more likely to lead to a situation where the statute is not as vigorously enforced in certain
areas of a state where local officials must deal with a large volume of other business.
41 Ark. Stat. Ann. § 71-2003 (Supp. 1967) ; Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6865.5 (West
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authority to establish rules and regulations, the investigation of violations
of the statute, and the authority to impose penalties. 42
There does not seem to be any particular need for those charged with
administration of the statute to have experience in the agency business. A board
composed of members of collection agencies could perhaps serve in a purely
advisory capacity to the official administering the statute. It seems best that
a board of this nature not have even this minimal position in the govern-
mental structure, as it enables those to be regulated to exercise potentially un-
due influence over administrative decisions.
Most statutes make the boards more than mere advisors.'" This arrange-
ment constitutes a classic example of industry orientation, if not agency
"capture." It is difficult to imagine such a board readily promulgating any
regulation that would benefit the public at the expense of the industry at
large. Concededly, such a board might be very efficient at detection and
punishment of violations of high-level visibility. Such a self-policing policy
operates in the collection agencies' own interest. Adverse publicity could lead to
more stringent legislation. In the cases not receiving such publicity or lacking
in visibility of a violation, the regulatory motive arising from the likelihood of
industry-wide detriment from non-enforcement is absent and such a board is
likely to be more sympathetic to the contentions of an agency than to those
of a debtor. In these circumstances the tension latent in the identity of the
regulator and regulated becomes apparent. And, unfortunately, the supra-ad-
visory sanctions given such boards by most statutes are likely to remain
withheld.
F. Investigation
The state regulatory authority, whatever its composition may be, is
generally empowered to investigate the practices of licensees. The states vary
on whether investigations are begun only upon the filing of a complaint,"
or whether the state body may examine agency conduct without receiving a
1964); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 27-1-3(2) (1964); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § 583
(Supp. 1968) ; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 67-15-28 (1961); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 697.402(1) (Supp.
1967).
42 For example, Arkansas gives the Board "the authority to revoke, suspend, or
refuse to issue a license for violation" of the statute, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 71-2004 (Supp.
1967); New Mexico makes its Board an advisor to the chief on the subject of new rules
and regulations, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 67-15-29 (1961).
43 Arkansas has only a board, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 71-2003 (Supp. 1967) ; California
appears to have a board that is mainly advisory, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 6863, 6868.5,
6925, 6930 (West 1964) ; Colorado gives administration of the statute to the Secretary
of State. Investigation of qualifications for a license is by the board, Colo. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 27-1-3(6) (1964). In addition, it is necessary for the board to find that the
complaint is based on probable cause before the Secretary of State will hold a hearing,
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 27-1-18(8) (1964); Maine allows the board to make the final
decision on suspension, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. fit. 32, § 578 (Supp. 1968); New Mexico
places the question of suspension in the hands of the board, N.M. Stat. Ann. § 67-15-74
(1961) ; Oregon makes the board the final authority on 'administrative remedies, Ore.
Rev. Stat. § 697.285(2) (Supp. 1967).
44 Ark. Stat. Ann. § 2004 (Supp. 1967); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 27-1-18 (1964) ;
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-45 (1965); The Model Act § 8.
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claim of a violation.45 Difficulty arises even from those provisions which al-
low the state body to initiate an investigation. The provisions do not pre-
scribe for a commissioner or board any frequency of investigation into the
activities of agencies. The absence of such standards of surveillance en-
courages the judicialization of state agencies. Instead of actively investigating
and eliminating abuses, the regulatory body tends to lapse into merely passive
receipt and disposition of complaints. Clearly this role is not adequate to the
problem. Much activity will go unreported to the administrative body be-
cause, as in the case of judicial remedies, debtors most in need of protection
are those least likely to seek relief from an enforcement or quasi-adjudicative
agency. Alienation from the legal processes is likely to inhibit the econom-
ically or educationally deprived debtor from seeking recourse from a remote
or passive regulatory body.
For these reasons, it would seem reasonable to require the administrative
body to investigate an agency if it were being sued in a civil action, even
though no complaint had been filed with the agency. Certainly a recovery by
a plaintiff against an agency should prompt some action by the state authority.
A further method for insuring proper coverage of the collection practices
would be a system of spot checking, probably more valuable in its deterrent
than its punitive effect.
G. Sanctions
The statutes often provide for both criminal and administrative sanc-
tions for violation of the act. The criminal penalty is generally a fine and/or
imprisonment." Its effectiveness naturally depends upon the diligence of en-
forcement and severity of punishment. Under the provisions for administrative
sanctions a collection agency is usually allowed a hearing before any penalty
is imposed.47 If the agency is found to have engaged in prohibited activity,
it may face suspension or revocation of its license." The loss of a license is
probably the most effective penalty since it makes the further operation of
business unlawful. Unfortunately the statutes do not use this sanction as
effectively as is possible. Most provisions establishing this penalty commit its
application to the discretion of the regulatory body." This approach is to be
45 Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6925 (West 1964) ; Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § .578
(Supp. 1968) ; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 67-15-72 (1961) ; Ore. Rev. Stat. § 697.230 (Supp. 1967).
49 See, for example, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 71-2010 (Supp. 1967); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 27-1-21 (1964) ; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 42-133 (1960); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 67-15-87
(1961) ; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-47 (196.5) ; Ore. Rev. Stat. § 697.990 (Supp. 1967).
47 Ark. Stat. Ann. § 71-2004 (Supp. 1967) ; Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6923.1 (West
'1964); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 27-1-18(8) (1964); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 32, § 578
(Supp. 1968) ; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 67-15-74 (1961) ; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-45 (1965) ; Ore.
Rev. Stat. § 697.270 (Supp. 1967) ; The Model Act § 8.
48 Ark. Stat. Ann. § 71-2004 (Supp. 1967); Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 6930 (West
1964); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 27-1-18(9) (1964); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Lit. 32, § 578
(Supp. 1968) ; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 67-15-29 (1961) ; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 66-45 (1965) ; Ore.
Rev. Stat. § 697.261 (Supp. 1967) ; The Model Act § 8.
49 Thus, the Arkansas statute states that "[t]he Board shall have the authority to
revoke, , .." This provision is not the same as one which says that a board must revoke a
license, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 71-2004 (Supp. 1967) ; New Mexico provides that "Wile
willful violation of any rules and regulations established by the chief for the conduct
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contrasted with the mandatory nature of the sections on fines." Therefore, it is
generally possible for an agency to act in a manner prohibited by the regulationS
and still maintain its license, regardless of the gravity or frequency of its
violation. So long as standards for litenSe suspension acre lacking and So long
as suspension remains a Matter of seldom used diStretion, its deterrent force
will be minimal. At a Certain point, a debtor should be assured that the
penalties for misconduct provided by the state will be utilized against an
agency. For example, a series of violations would seem to indicate sufficient
disregard for the regulations to cause the suspension or revocation of a license.
Yet, there is no suggestion in the statutes that a certain number Of violations
is enough to require even a brief StspenSiOn. (Some analogy might be drawn
to automobile regulationS that require a suspension of a driver's license for 30
days for the first violation, 60 dayS for the second, and so forth.) Without
Such a requirement, the effectiVenesS of the legislation depends upon the
fortuitous identity of enforcement personnel. And, as has been noted, strict
enforcement is already doubtful when the discretion-wielding regulatory
bodies are manned by industry-oriented officials.
CONCLUSION
An examination of both the available civil remedies and the relevant state
legislation compels the conclusion that neither meets the problem raised by
certain practices of collection agencies. Judicial attempts to moderate the con-
duct of agencies have operated through recovery in actions grounded on in-
tentional infliction of mental anguish, invasion of privacy, and defamation.
The common law approach has obvious shortcomings. The requirement that a
debtor show damages permits an agency in many cases to act reprehensibly
so long as the debtor is not physically or financially injured. Litigation may
cause a debtor unwanted publicity. The people most in need of protection,
those in the lower economic and educational strata, are those most alienated
from the judicial system and least willing to take part in a court action.
Finally, judicially developed standards are usually crystallized only after a
prolonged line of cases.
Nor does existing legislation adequately cope with the problem. To apply
standards of entry into the collection industry, most states require agencies
to obtain a license. A written examination may further aid evaluation of ap-
plicants seeking to operate collection agencies. Neither of these provisions
typically gives a debtor very much protection. Licensing standards reserve
of licensee is sufficient ground for revocation of the license of a licensee, or other dis-
ciplinary action." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 67-15-29 (1961); Oregon provides that "[t]he Real
Estate Division may suspend, revoke or refuse to renew or grant any license or certifi-
cate . . . if the licensee . . has been . . . convicted of . . . violating any rule and
regulation of the division." Ore. Rev. Stat. § 697.261 (Supp. 1967). Compare Colorado's
statute providing, "If . . the secretary of state shall find the licensee guilty of such
charges, his license shall be revoked and cancelled." Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 27-1-18(9)
(1964).
50 For example, "any person who shall violate any provision of this act, shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor subject to a fine of not more than $500.00 and not less than
$50.00." Ark. Stat. Ann. § 71-2010 (Supp. 1967).
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great discretion to state bodies with regard to entrance qualifications, and the
examinations are usually of a very limited nature.
However, the major defect of present legislation appears to lie in its ad-
ministrative procedures. The enforcement of the provisions is often commit-
ted, at least in part, to a board with a majority composed of personnel chosen
from the regulated business. This group retains discretionary control over
both the type of conduct prohibited and the penalties attached to such con-
duct. Such discretionary power is especially significant with regard to revo-
cation of licenses, since standards are lacking as to what type of conduct may
result in the loss of a license. The present arrangement allows the regulated
group to play a substantial part in the regulation. In addition, present legis-
lation fails to standardize the frequency or scope of administrative surveil-
lance. For states genuinely resolved to curb the abusive practices of the debt
collection industry, these legislative deficiencies signal an appropriate starting
point for effective reform.
SETH D. SHENFIELD
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